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Abstract—Soon after its introduction in 2009, Bitcoin has been
adopted by cyber-criminals, which rely on its pseudonymity to
implement virtually untraceable scams. One of the typical scams
that operate on Bitcoin are the so-called Ponzi schemes. These
are fraudulent investments which repay users with the funds
invested by new users that join the scheme, and implode when
it is no longer possible to find new investments. Despite being
illegal in many countries, Ponzi schemes are now proliferating on
Bitcoin, and they keep alluring new victims, who are plundered
of millions of dollars. We apply data mining techniques to
detect Bitcoin addresses related to Ponzi schemes. Our starting
point is a dataset of features of real-world Ponzi schemes,
that we construct by analysing, on the Bitcoin blockchain, the
transactions used to perform the scams. We use this dataset to
experiment with various machine learning algorithms, and we
assess their effectiveness through standard validation protocols
and performance metrics. The best of the classifiers we have
experimented can identify most of the Ponzi schemes in the
dataset, with a low number of false positives.
Index Terms—Bitcoin, data mining, fraud detection
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin [1], [2] is decentralized cryptocurrency, which al-
lows secure transfers of money — the bitcoins — without the
intermediation of trusted authorities. All transfers of bitcoins
are recorded on the blockchain, an immutable public ledger
of transactions maintained by a peer-to-peer network through
a distributed consensus protocol.
Users can send and receive bitcoins without revealing their
true identity: rather, they use pseudonyms (called addresses),
which may even be generated fresh for each transaction.
Although several approaches to de-anonymise addresses have
been proposed [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], specular attempts to
strengthen the anonymity of Bitcoin [8], [9], [6], [10], [11]
reinforce the perception that criminal activities on Bitcoin are
easy to implement, and hard to detect.
Besides classic criminal activities like ransomware [7], [12],
[13] and money laundering [14], [15], Bitcoin is currently
being used as a payment infrastructure for Ponzi schemes [16].
These are financial frauds disguised as “high-yield” investment
programs: actually, a Ponzi scheme repays users only with
the funds invested by new users that join the scheme, and
so it implodes when it is no longer possible to find new
investments [17], [18].
Despite many victims are perfectly aware of their fraudulent
nature, and of the fact that they are illegal in many coun-
tries, Bitcoin-based Ponzi schemes are proliferating. A recent
study [19] inspects the posts on bitcointalk.org (a popular
discussion forum on Bitcoin), finding more than 1800 Ponzi
schemes from June 2011 to November 2016. Estimating the
economic impact of Bitcoin-based Ponzi schemes is more
difficult, due to the lack of datasets of Ponzi-related Bitcoin ad-
dresses: a conservative estimate for the period from September
2013 to September 2014 shows that Ponzi schemes operated
through Bitcoin have gathered more than 7 millions USD. The
absence of suitable prevention and intervention policies leads
us to believe that many other thousands of victims have been
cheated since then, and plundered of millions of USD.
Most of the existing approaches to the analysis of Bitcoin
scams require a laborious initial phase of manual or semi-
automated search on the web [14], [15], [16], [19], [20],
[21], [22] in order to collect Bitcoin addresses involved in
the scam. Only after this phase it is possible to automatize the
analysis, e.g. to quantify the impact of the scam by inspecting
the associated transactions on the blockchain. However, these
approaches are ineffective when the scam addresses are not
publicly available, e.g. because they are communicated pri-
vately to registered users, or published only through the deep
web or the dark web. In these cases it would be desirable to
have tools that automatically search the Bitcoin blockchain
for suspect behaviours, and identify the addresses associated
to fraudulent activities.
Given the ever-increasing volumes of data to be managed
(∼300 millions of transactions, and several millions of distinct
addresses) data mining techniques have become almost imper-
ative for automatically extracting meaningful patterns for fraud
detection. Outside the cryptocurrency realm, several works in
the literature have explored these techniques with data from
credit card operations, either in a supervised setting (which
requires a set of labelled observations from the past) [23],
[24] or through unsupervised approaches (which look for
anomalous data occurrences or outliers) [25], [26]. However,
despite an increasing amount of research in the field, practical
implementations are rarely reported, as recently pointed out
in [27]. Furthermore, the scarcity of publicly available datasets
leaves unanswered many questions about which is the best
strategy to deal with specific real-world scenarios [28].
The extension of existing fraud detection methods to cyber-
crime analysis in Bitcoin is an almost unexplored field. A
few attempts have been recently made to detect anomalies
in the Bitcoin transaction network by unsupervised learning
approaches [29], [30], but no work exists, to the best of our
knowledge, that investigates how to learn detection models for
specific types of scams (such as Ponzi schemes).
Contributions: We investigate data mining techniques to
automatically detect and quantify Bitcoin Ponzi schemes,
following the supervised learning approach.
In the absence of publicly available datasets, our first step
is to retrieve from the web a collection of Bitcoin addresses
related to Ponzi schemes. To this purpose we manually search
the main discussion forums on Bitcoin (e.g., Reddit and
bitcointalk.org) for advertisements of “high-yield” investment
programs, that inevitably hide Ponzi schemes. Then, we
visit the websites through which Ponzi schemes are operated
(possibly recovering old snapshots through Internet Archive),
hunting for their Bitcoin addresses. We expand our collection
through a semi-automatic visit of the websites that are linked
to Bitcoin addresses on blockchain.info/tags. Following this
methodology, we collect 32 Bitcoin addresses which gather
deposits from investors of Ponzi schemes.
In many cases, Ponzi schemes use multiple addresses:
actually, some of them provide the deposit address only upon
registration, generating a fresh address for each new user. In
order to retrieve some of these addresses, we apply a clustering
procedure on the addresses in our collection, using the “multi-
input” heuristic [3]. By analyzing the obtained clusters, we find
that 19 out of 32 Ponzi schemes in our collection use more
then one address, for a total of 1211 addresses. Overall, these
clusters have received deposits for ∼10 millions USD.
We then devise a set of features that can be useful to
characterise Ponzi schemes. These features range from simple
statistics on the transactions to/from the clusters (e.g., over-
all transferred value, ratio between incoming and outgoing
transactions, etc.) to more complex ones, like measures of
inequality of the transferred values (e.g., Gini coefficients), and
measures of the activity of the scheme (e.g., lifetime, average
delay between incoming and outgoing transactions, maximum
number of daily transactions, etc.). We extract from the Bitcoin
blockchain the transactions of the clusters of addresses in our
collection, and we compute a dataset of features, which we
make publicly available. We complete this dataset with the
features of 6400 randomly-chosen addresses.
We use this dataset to experiment with various supervised
learning algorithms, in order to automatically detect Ponzi
schemes. We formalise the detection model as a binary clas-
sification problem, where the task is to distinguish between
‘Ponzi’ and ‘non-Ponzi’ class instances. One of the most
critical challenges we had to face is the class imbalance
problem, which is commonly encountered in fraud detection
systems [31]. In a supervised learning setting, as the one
here considered, this problem occurs when one class is very
rare compared to the other(s), thus making hard to discover
robust patterns for the minority class (like “finding a needle
in a haystack”). Indeed, classifiers are usually designed to
minimize the total number of classification errors, and tend
to be overwhelmed by the majority class.
In fraud detection applications, as in many domains with
imbalanced class distributions, a correct classification of the
rare class (i.e., the ‘Ponzi’ class in our problem) is far more
important than a correct classification of the majority class
(i.e., the ‘non-Ponzi’ class). The underlying assumption is that
the cost of misclassifying a fraudulent case is much higher
than the cost of misclassifying a legitimate case (as the latter
error can be corrected a posteriori through a further analysis).
In this work we experiment with the two main approaches
proposed in the literature, i.e. sampling-based approaches [32]
and cost-sensitive approaches [33].
A number of experiments across different settings resulted
in a detection model with good performance, which is finally
applied, with promising results, to an independent set of data.
The supervised method Random Forest proved to be the most
effective and most versatile one. In our dataset, containing
the features of 6432 clusters of addresses (proportion of one
fraud to 200 not fraud), Random Forest has obtained a Recall
of 0.969 for Ponzi schemes, and it has classified correctly 31
Ponzi schemes out of 32.
In summary, our main contributions are:
1) a public dataset of addresses and features of Bitcoin Ponzi
schemes (goo.gl/ToCho7);
2) an open-source tool that extracts the dataset from the
Bitcoin blockchain (github.com/bitcoinponzi);
3) a systematic evaluation and comparison of different learn-
ing strategies for classifying Bitcoin Ponzi schemes;
4) the evaluation of the best classifier (among those we have
experimented with) on an independent dataset, which
manages to identify most of the Ponzi schemes in the
dataset, with a low number of false positives;
5) an estimate of which are the most discriminating features
for detecting Ponzi schemes on Bitcoin.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives a minimalistic introduction to Bitcoin. Section III il-
lustrates our methodology for collecting addresses of Ponzi
schemes, and for constructing a dataset of Ponzi-related fea-
tures. Section IV compares the effectiveness of various learn-
ing strategies. Finally, Section V draws some conclusions.
II. BITCOIN IN A NUTSHELL
In this section we give a short introduction to Bitcoin,
focussing on the notion that are needed later on for our
technical development.
Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer infrastructure which allow users to
transfer currency — the bitcoins (B). Each Bitcoin user owns
one or more pairs of asymmetric cryptographic keys: public
keys uniquely identify the user addresses, while private keys
are used to authorize payments. Transfers of bitcoins are de-
scribed by transactions. The log of all transactions, is recorded
on a public, immutable data structure (the blockchain), deter-
mining the balance of each address. Users can receive bitcoins
through different addresses: typically, addresses are generated
fresh for each transaction, to improve privacy.
The Bitcoin network is populated by a large set of nodes,
called miners, which collect transactions from users, and are
in charge of appending the valid ones to the blockchain. To
this purpose, each miner keeps a local copy of the blockchain,
and a set of transactions received by users. Appending a new
Tin1: · · ·
wit1: · · ·
out1(x): versigA(x)
val1: 1B
out2(y): versigB(y)
val2: 2B
TA
in1: (T, 1)
wit1: sigA(TA)
out1(x): versigB(x)
val1: 0.9B
out2(y): versigA(y)
val2: 0.1B
TB
in1: (T, 2)
wit1: sigB(TB)
in2: (TA , 1)
wit2: sigB(TB)
out1(x): versigC(x)
val1: 2.5B
Figure 1: Three Bitcoin transactions.
block of transactions to the blockchain requires miners to solve
a moderately-hard cryptographic puzzle, which involves the
transactions in the new block. The difficulty of the puzzle is
adjusted dynamically to ensure that the average mining rate
is of 1 block every 10 minutes. The miner which solves the
puzzle before the others receives a reward in newly generated
bitcoins (through the so-called coinbase transactions), and a
fee for each transaction included in the new block.
To explain how transactions work, we consider the example
in Figure 1, which graphically represents three transactions.
Each transaction has four (indexed) fields: in, wit, out, and val.
The in field (for input) contains a reference to the transaction
output to redeem. The wit field contains a piece of information
called witness, discussed below. The field out contains an
output script: intuitively, this is a predicate on one or more
arguments, the actual values of which are provided by the
witness of the redeeming transaction. Finally, the field val
determines the amount of bitcoins to be transferred.
Consider first the transaction T in our example, where we
neglect the fields in and wit (e.g., we could assume that T is a
coinbase transaction). The output at index 1 allows to transfer
1B to user A: namely, the output script versig
A
(x) verifies
the signature x of A on the redeeming transaction. Similarly,
the output at index 2 allows to transfer 2B to B. Assume that
the blockchain contains T, and that both its outputs are not
redeemed by subsequent transactions.
Transaction TA has one input, represented as the pair (T, 1),
meaning that it wants to redeem the output at index 1 of
transaction T. To do so, TA carries in its witness a signature
of A, which is computed on the whole transaction TA (except
for the wit field itself). This witness makes the output script
versigA(x) in T evaluate to true. Therefore, when A appends
TA to the blockchain, it redeems the first output of T, making
available 0.9B for B, and keeping 0.1B for herself.
The transaction TB has two inputs, meaning that it wants
to simultaneously redeem the second output of T and the first
output of TA . Since these outputs are still unspent, and the
witnesses in TB satisfy the corresponding output scripts, then
B can append TB to the blockchain, making available 2.5B
to user C. The difference of 0.4B between the the sum of the
values of all the inputs of TB and the sum of the values of its
outputs is paid as a fee to the miners.
Bitcoin transactions may be more general than the ones
illustrated by the previous example. For instance, the output
script is a program in a (not Turing-complete) scripting
language, featuring a limited set of logic, arithmetic, and
cryptographic operators. Transactions can also specify time
constraints on when they can be appended to the blockchain,
and also on when the redeeming transactions can be appended.
We omit a detailed presentation of these advanced features,
since they are not required in the following sections.
III. DATASET CONSTRUCTION
The first step of our work is to collect Bitcoin addresses
through which Ponzi schemes receive money from investors
(Section III-A). We apply a clustering algorithm to the col-
lected addresses, finding that some schemes use wallets of
hundreds of addresses (Section III-B). We then devise a set of
features that are relevant to the classification of Ponzi schemes
(Section III-C), and we compute the values of these features
on our clustered addresses, obtaining a dataset that we use
in Section IV to train classifiers (Section III-D).
A. Collection of Bitcoin addresses used by Ponzi schemes
We perform a manual search on Reddit and bitcointalk.org,
the main discussion forums on Bitcoin. In particular, we
focus on the subforum Gambling: Investor-based games of
bitcointalk.org, where fraudsters are used to advertise Ponzi
schemes as “high-yield investment programs” (HYIP), or as
gambling games. Only in a few cases these advertisements
explicitly include the Bitcoin address where to deposit money;
in all the other cases, to obtain the address we have to visit the
websites where the Ponzi schemes are hosted. However, many
of these websites are no longer online: in such case we try
to recover their snapshots through Internet Archive. For each
website (either live or snapshot), we manually search its pages
to find the deposit addresses (typically, different “investment
plans” use different addresses). Some websites only allow
registered users to read the deposit address: in these cases,
we create an account, providing fake data.
We extend our search by considering all the addresses
listed on blockchain.info/tags, a website which allows users
to tag Bitcoin addresses. Most of the tagged addresses also
contain a link to the website where they are mentioned. We
develop a crawler to automatically parse these websites, and
rank them according to the number of Ponzi-related words
contained in their pages. To this purpose we use a dictionary,
containing words like e.g. “Ponzi”, “profit”, “HYIP”, “multi-
plier”, “investment”, “MLM”. The crawler parses over 1500
websites (related to ∼3500 tags), finding that ∼900 of them
contain some Ponzi-related word. However, many of these
sites (∼600) are no longer accessible, even through Internet
Archive. For the remaining websites, we manually search for
deposit addresses, creating fake accounts when needed.
Overall, we find 32 deposit addresses of Ponzi schemes, that
we display in Table I. Note that, while some Ponzi schemes
use a single deposit address throughout their lives, some others
use multiple addresses, possibly generating a fresh address
for each user (or set of users). Address clustering, discussed
below, allows us to recover some of these addresses.
Table I: Collection of addresses of Bitcoin Ponzi schemes.
Ponzi scheme Deposit address
Nanoindustryinv.com 1Ee9ZiZkmygAXUiyeYKRSA3tLe4vNYEAgA
GrandAgoFinance 1MzNQ7HV8dQ6XQ52zBGYkCZkkWv2Pd3VG6
Cryptory 1FyedPPk923wRfmVphV1CLt3bVLGxHZXpK
Leancy 145SmDToAhtfcBQhNxfeM8hnS6CBeiRukY
Minimalist10 1FuypAdeC7mSmYBsQLbG9XV261bnfgWbgB
MiniPonziCoin 1F8ZKpjMDpnpF79mZ1pxZRoNKZgXm4Tf1d
120cycle 1E5MCTtXn7n2svpZ1bDHZXndY9K7qQeqZP
10PERCENTBTC 1BtcBoSSnqe8mFJCUEyCNmo3EcF8Yzhpnc
btcgains 1PayoutRrC8wxxZ9ygmeaRj3qTPug8tDYu
PonziIO 1ponziUjuCVdB167ZmTWH48AURW1vE64q
LaxoTrade 1LaxoTrQy51LnB289VmoSAgN6J6UrJbfL9
OpenPonzi 1BmZW65ZoeLa1kbL9MPFLfkS818mqFUSma
BTC-doubler.us 1AQp51H22WHDzLgK64NoUo3Bg3T183QR22
BTC-doubler.com 178BzARKjkszrTyx4TxBKHhzGLZijdE26e
investorbitcoin.com 1CpVAEg4BgVzjiHshgeZfitZLV1t1zo6Qg
Ponzi120 12PoNZiEtabwkCU4YFffshWNF1cRiAk5nq
RockwellPartners 139eeGkMGR6F9EuJQ3qYoXebfkBbNAsLtV
Twelverized 114Ap9G5nu78vESC648amPwSeqUorPtV5L
CRYPTOSX2 19YZYfMB3mfX8AixzV7aLqXuViDcntrfcK
1hourbtc.pw 1BsjsaHST2Qohs8ZHxNHeZ1UfWhtxoKHEN
bitcoindoubler.fund 1FNtgGsHhymmEUMXrMiFeMtZbuagnnS59c
doublebitcoin.life 1zmeu5BeWBprWyPv5ntNZKR7uThXaG9ic
bitcoincopy.site123.me 1EaSVdRuzcz4yjnTmibabyyrczvaQS8hAJ
bitcoinprofit2 1AXTqWYz1Bd3LZnq1Zf9vsgFBpqrKkHopx
invest4profit 1PZ8E5oT7EUVgEVz1Ggc7bjXe2byxr7wxG
1getpaid.me 1GetPaiDxjEuWN3KJTnY9Cbqv9QcR8zcME
Ponzi.io (change) 14ji9KmegNHhTchf4ftkt3J1ywmijGjd6M
igjam.com 1AQxcdPgMTTQghPXt1EXHU8vEjSn2kYrPQ
7dayponzi 195o79saDhUNHJ4DeMBYMekLmrQ848APxA
world-btc.online 1A88teD6QqXRHBMCyCkoxxBQHpJAztUz6e
bestdoubler.eu 13NZxtAnKk5mbCUHpxHqKwWTDJzFHMGHLh
bitcoindoubler.prv.pl 18Smkvyf3gJN4z59FhjJsCu6NhSYmZkNvG
B. Address clustering
Many techniques to break the anonymity of Bitcoin users
have been proposed in the literature. This is achieved either
by grouping together (“clustering”) the addresses controlled
by each user [3], [4], [5], or by using observations on the
underlying peer-to-peer network [34], [35], or by combining
both techniques [36].
Several heuristics for address clustering have been proposed
over the years. Besides analysing the shape of the transac-
tion graph, some heuristics also take into consideration the
behavior of standard clients [5]. To construct our dataset of
Ponzi-related addresses, we use the multi-input heuristic [3],
[4], the simplest and most efficient one. The key assumption
of this heuristic is that, in a multi-input transaction (like e.g.
TB in Figure 1), all the addresses referred to within the inputs
are controlled by the same user. These transactions occur, for
instance, when a user A wishes to transfer a certain amount of
vB to another user B, but none of the transactions in A’s wallet
has an unspent output of at least vB. In this case, to avoid
paying multiple transaction fees, A can perform the transfer
in a single shot, by putting on the blockchain a multi-input
transaction redeemable by B, where the sum of the values
redeemed by the inputs is at least vB. Typical Bitcoin clients
implement this by choosing the input transactions from A’s
wallet, satisfying the assumption of the multi-input heuristic.
We show in Table II some statistics on the clusters that
we obtain after applying the multi-input heuristic to the 32
addresses in our collection. The columns display the size of the
clusters, the overall number of transactions (either incoming
Table II: Top-10 Ponzi schemes by cluster size.
Ponzi scheme #Addr. #Tx In (B) In ($)
LaxoTrade 491 4798 1,580 570,106
Cryptory 232 22,823 9,439 4,658,008
1hourbtc 180 1262 36 42,668
120cycle 78 284 14 8263
bitcoindoubler.fund 63 1143 90 288,849
world-btc.online 41 302 1 2060
Ponzi.io 33 6311 370 258,368
btcgains 14 789 72 33,246
10PERCENTBTC 13 10,077 107 42,894
investorbitcoin.com 11 672 312 158,569
Total (32 schemes) 1211 107,637 17,910 9,509,050
or outgoing), and the overall inflow, both in B and in USD.
To convert the amount of each transaction to USD, we use the
average exchange rate on the day of the transaction, obtained
from www.coindesk.com/price. Overall, the Ponzi schemes in
our collection gathered almost 10 millions USD; the scheme
that raised the most is Cryptory, with ∼ 4.6 millions USD.
C. Features extraction
We now introduce a set of features, which are relevant for
the classification of Bitcoin addresses.
• The lifetime of the address, expressed in number of days.
This is computed as the difference between the date of
the first transaction to the address, and the date of the
last transaction to/from the address.
• The activity days, i.e. the number of days in which there
has been at least a transaction to/from the address.
• The maximum number of daily transactions to/from the
address.
• The Gini coefficient of the values transferred to (resp.
from) the address. Gini coefficients are a standard repre-
sentation of the degree of inequality of wealth: 0 indicates
perfect equality, while 100 is perfect inequality [16].
• The sum of all the values transferred to (resp. from) the
address.
• The number of incoming (resp. outgoing) transactions
which transfer money to (resp. from) the address.
• The ratio between incoming and outgoing transactions
to/from the address.
• The average (resp. standard deviation) of the values
transferred to/from the address.
• The number of different addresses which have transferred
money to the address, and subsequently received money
from it.
• The minimum (resp. maximum, average) delay between
the time when the address has received some bitcoins,
and the time it has sent some others.
• The maximum difference between the balance of the
address in two consecutive days.
All the features above are defined “pointwise” on single
Bitcoin address. We extend them to clusters in the straightfor-
ward way: any feature on a cluster is the composition of the
pointwise features on the addresses included in the cluster.
As an additional “componentwise” feature, we consider the
number of addresses included in the cluster.
D. Dataset construction
We construct a binary dataset that contains two classes of
instances: Ponzi schemes (denoted as P) and others (denoted
as nP). Each instance in the dataset corresponds to a cluster
of Bitcoin addresses (computed as shown in Section III-B),
and it is represented as a tuple of features (the ones defined
in Section III-C, plus the class label P or nP). To compute
these dataset instances we exploit an open-source tool for
custom blockchain analytics [37].
We populate the dataset with 32 instances of the class
P (corresponding to our clusters of Ponzi schemes), and
with 6400 randomly-chosen instances of the class nP (which
are clustered with the multi-input heuristic as well). This
strong imbalance between the two classes (approximately, 1
Ponzi instance every 200 instances of non-Ponzi) is needed
to properly model the fact that Ponzi-related addresses are
extremely rare, compared to non-Ponzi ones. Although 1/200
is still much higher then the expected ratio between Ponzi
addresses and non-Ponzi ones, it is a necessary compromise
to meaningfully represent also the rare class in the dataset.
IV. DATA MINING FOR PONZI SCHEMES
We formalise the induction of a detection model for Bitcoin
Ponzi schemes as a binary classification problem, where the
task is to distinguish between ‘Ponzi’ and ‘non-Ponzi’ class
instances. The strategies for dealing with the imbalanced
distribution of the classes are discussed below (Section IV-A),
along with the learning algorithms applied to induce the model
(Section IV-B), the performance metrics and the validation
protocol (Section IV-C). A number of experiments across
different settings (Section IV-D) resulted in a detection model
with good performance, which is then applied, with promising
results, to an independent set of data (Section IV-E). Finally,
we investigate which are the most relevant features, among
those in our set, to detect Ponzi schemes (Section IV-F).
A. Class imbalance problem
The class imbalance problem is one of the most critical
issues faced by fraud detection systems [31]. In a supervised
learning setting, as the one here considered, this problem
occurs when one class is very rare compared to the other(s),
thus making hard to discover robust patterns for the minority
class. Indeed, classifiers are usually designed to minimize
the total number of classification errors, and tend to be
overwhelmed by the majority class.
In fraud detection applications, as in many domains with
imbalanced class distributions, a correct classification of the
rare class (i.e., the P class in our problem) is far more impor-
tant than a correct classification of the majority class (i.e., the
nP class), since the cost of misclassifying a fraudulent case
is usually higher than the cost of misclassifying a legitimate
case (as the latter can be corrected through ex-post analyses).
A number of approaches have been proposed in the lit-
erature for handling this problem, including sampling-based
approaches [32] and cost-sensitive approaches [33].
Sampling-based approaches: The basic idea is to modify
the distribution of instances so that the minority class is
adequately represented in the dataset used for model develop-
ment. The most common sampling technique is random un-
dersampling (RUS), which consists in removing observations
at random from the majority class. An alternative approach is
random oversampling (ROS), where some of the minority in-
stances are replicated, but with an increased risk of overfitting,
particularly with noisy data [28]. Though more sophisticated
(and expensive) approaches exist, they have not proved to be
superior in severe imbalance settings [38]. Furthermore, the
effectiveness of sampling techniques may be dependent on
the learning algorithm used (and on the adopted performance
measure); as well, the extent of sampling for best performance
may be domain-dependent.
Cost-sensitive approaches: Cost-sensitive learning involves
the use of a cost matrix which encodes the penalty of
classifying instances from one class as another. In a class
imbalance setting, where the focus is usually on rare instances,
a misclassification of the minority class is penalized more
than a misclassification of the majority class. For a given
classification model, penalty terms are then used to derive
an overall cost which reflects the “weight” of the different
types of classification errors, besides their total number. Cost-
sensitive classification techniques take this cost matrix into
consideration in the training phase, in order to generate the
classification model with the lowest overall cost.
In this work we consider both sampling-based and cost-
sensitive approaches. Furthermore, we experiment with learn-
ers whose inner design can cope, at least to some extent, with
imbalanced class distributions, as in the case of the RIPPER
algorithm proposed in [39].
B. Classifiers
In the induction stage of our detection model, we exploited
RIPPER, Bayes Network and Random Forest classifiers, which
are representatives of quite different learning strategies.
RIPPER is a propositional rule learner that relies on a
sequential covering logic [39] to extract classification rules
directly from training data. Rules are grown in a greedy
fashion, starting from empty rule antecedents and repeatedly
adding conjuncts in order to maximize the information gain
measure. An incremental reduced error pruning technique is
used the refine the resulting rules. Since the algorithm is
designed to give higher priority to the least frequent class,
this approach is particularly suited for dealing with imbalanced
classification tasks, as in the case of fraud detection.
Bayes Network is a probabilistic model that represents,
in the form of a directed acyclic graph, the relation of
conditional dependence among a set of variables (the features
and the target class, in the context of classification problems).
Probabilistic parameters are encoded in a set of tables, one
for each node of the network, in the form of local conditional
distributions of a variable given its parents. Both the network
structure and the probability values can be estimated from a
training set of labelled instances. Bayesian models have been
applied in the context of fraud detection systems, e.g. in [40].
Random Forest is an ensemble method that exploits mul-
tiple decision trees built from random variants of the same
data [41]. Although a single tree may be unstable and overly
sensitive to the specific composition of the training set, the
aggregation of the predictions made by the individual trees in
the forest has been shown to achieve much better performance.
Compared to other ensemble approaches, Random Forest is
computationally efficient and has proved to be a “best of class”
learner in several domains [42], including fraud detection [23].
For the above classifiers, we leverage the implementation
provided by the Weka machine learning library [43].
C. Performance measures and validation
To evaluate the performance of our detection models, we
rely on best practices from the literature.
Specifically, in the context of binary problems with im-
balanced class distributions, as in the case here considered,
the rare class is denoted as the positive class, while the
majority class is denoted as the negative class. The following
terminology is then used to describe how the model performs
on a given set of test instances: a true positive (resp. negative)
is a positive (resp. negative) instance correctly classified by
the model; a false negative is a positive instance wrongly
classified as negative; a false positive is a negative instance
wrongly classified as positive.
Depending on the specific characteristics of the data at hand,
different metrics can be used for quantifying the extent to
which the model is able to recognize positive and negative
instances [43]. Hereafter, TP (resp. TN) refers to the number
of true positives (resp. negatives), while FP (resp. FN) refers
to the number of false positives (resp. negatives):
Accuracy ((TP + TN)/(TP + TN + FP + FN)) is the fraction
of test instances whose class is predicted correctly;
Specificity (TN/(TN+FP)) is the fraction of negative instances
classified correctly;
Sensitivity (TP/(TP+FN)), also called Recall, is the fraction
of positive instances classified correctly;
Precision (TP/(TP+FP)) is the fraction of instances that actu-
ally are positive in the group the model has predicted as
positive;
F-measure (2·Precision·Recall / (Precision+Recall)) is the
harmonic mean between precision and recall;
G-mean (Recall·Specificity)(0.5) is the geometric mean be-
tween specificity and recall;
AUC is the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristics
(ROC) curve, which shows the trade-off between true
positive and false positive rates (the better the model,
the closer the area is to 1).
Accuracy is the most common performance metric but,
alone, is not suited for evaluating models induced from im-
balanced datasets. In a fraud detection context, if 0.5% of the
instances are fraudulent (as in our dataset), then a model that
predicts every instance as non-fraudulent has an accuracy of
99.5%, even though it fails to detect any of the frauds. In
this situation, class-specific metrics (such as specificity, recall
and precision) can help to better describe and understand the
model behaviour. In particular, recall and precision are widely
used in applications where the successful detection of the rare
class is considered more interesting or important (as for the
‘Ponzi’ class in our problem).
To avoid building models that maximize one metric at the
expense of another, trade-off values such those expressed by
F-measure and G-mean are taken into account. In turn, AUC
is usually considered more significant than accuracy when
comparing the overall performance of different classifiers.
Instead of using a single test set to compute the above
metrics, we adopt an iterative cross-validation protocol, which
involves splitting the original dataset into K subsets of the
same size (folds). At each iteration, one of the folds is retained
as test data for evaluating the model performance, while the
remaining K − 1 folds are used as training data for building
the model. This procedure is repeated K times, using each
time a different fold as test set, and the results of the K runs
are finally aggregated to obtain TP, TN, FP and FN counts. In
our experiments, based on common practise in the literature,
we set K = 10.
D. Results
We now present the results obtained with RIPPER, Bayes
Net and Random Forest classifiers presented in Section IV-B.
Hereafter, we use the following acronyms: RIP for RIPPER,
BN for Bayes Net and RF for Random Forest.
First, we evaluate their performance without applying the
sampling-based and the cost-sensitive approaches (see Sec-
tion IV-A). The results are shown in Figure 2 in the form of
confusion matrices, where the row index refers to the actual
class, while the column index refers to the predicted class. As
we can see, the classification performance is not satisfactory,
due to the high number of Ponzi schemes not recognized.
Bayes Net classifies correctly the largest number of Ponzi
instances (23 out of 32), but the number of false positives
(i.e., non-Ponzi classified as Ponzi) is the highest as well.
These results confirm that learning from highly imbalanced
datasets is a very difficult task.
As a next step, we explore the effectiveness of the random
undersampling approach, which has proved to be useful to
deal with datasets where the fraud rate is comparable with the
one here considered [23]. Specifically, at each iteration of the
cross-validation procedure, we manipulate the training set to
reduce the extent of class imbalance: the original proportion
of 1 Ponzi instance every 200 instances of non-Ponzi (1:200)
is reduced to 1 Ponzi every 40 non-Ponzi (1:40), 1 Ponzi every
20 non-Ponzi (1:20), 1 Ponzi every 10 non-Ponzi (1:10) and
1 Ponzi every 5 non-Ponzi (1:5). Note that we do not modify
the class distribution of the test instances, to not introduce any
bias in the final performance estimate.
The results in Figure 3 show that the undersampling ap-
proach results in an improved true positive rate. In particular,
within the 1:5 setting, Random Forest recognizes the same
number of Ponzi as Bayes Net (25 out of 32), but with
a significantly lower number of false positives. Bayes Net,
indeed, produces too many false positives (266), even more
than RIPPER (226). Thus, while improving the true positive
rate (and hence the recall metric), the undersampling approach
is not quite satisfactory in terms of false positives (that affect
the precision metric). This difficulty of achieving an optimal
trade-off between recall and precision is a recognized issue in
the fraud detection literature [31].
As a further step, we investigate the effectiveness of the
cost-sensitive approach. When learning our detection models,
we use the cost matrices shown in Figure 4. In the matrix
CM5, the cost of committing a false negative error is 5 times
larger than the cost of committing a false positive error; it is
10 times larger in CM10, 20 times larger in CM20 and 40
times larger in CM40.
The results achieved by the cost-sensitive classifiers are
shown in Figure 5. As we can see from the confusion matrices,
RIPPER obtains the same results as in the original setting
(Figure 2). This is not surprising, since the algorithm is
designed to cope with the rare (i.e., positive) class and turns
out to be insensitive to further penalising a wrong classification
of the positive instances. In turn, Bayes Net does not seem
to take significant advantage of the cost-sensitive approach,
which results in 24 true positives (one more than in the original
setting), but with an increased number of false positives.
The best results are obtained with the Random Forest classi-
fier. Using the CM5 matrix, it recognizes 25 Ponzi schemes, as
Bayes Net in the 1:5 undersampling setting, but with a strong
reduction of the false positives (only 13). When penalising
more the false negatives, the number of the true positives
increases (29 using CM10 and 31 using CM20) and the number
of false positives increases in turn, but to an acceptable extent
(26 e 77 respectively). Increasing further the cost (CM40) is
not beneficial since the number of true positives remains the
same but the false positives increase to 132.
In Figure 6, we further detail the performance of the
cost-sensitive Random Forest classifier, that has shown to be
superior to the other approaches here explored. Different per-
formance metrics are computed as explained in Section IV-C).
In terms of accuracy, which simply expresses the fraction
of correctly classified instances (irrespective of their class),
the best result is achieved with the CM5 cost matrix. It also
ensures the highest true negative rate (specificity) and a good
trade-off between recall and precision (in terms of F-measure).
However, given the specific characteristics of the considered
domain, where the correct classification of Ponzi schemes is
of paramount importance, we consider especially relevant the
recall value, which is optimised using the CM20 cost matrix.
The G-mean value, that expresses a trade-off between recall
and specificity, is also better with CM20 and, in this setting,
Table III: Addresses of the alternative set of Ponzi schemes.
Ponzi scheme Deposit address
Longtermpaying 1MnuUkqvsyZdwd3xyM354kqVoPBhfBGE78
ebitinvest.com 1LkT3qubANxtSHvxokZ8Nkrv6k7EFi6F1
PonziCoin 1NcHirWVDfUAngWLjBzmPCQaeZaMPCceHC
CoinDoubleP2 15vr3X25cgfMBXpX8PQP3M6bQViFgqrm6U
CoinDoubleP1 1AA4A7cbVf3wMtG1RrhDoPkjAX2C1RJMjW
CoinDoubleP3 1NNSgNDU52W79QbXHGSBYHW874nQYb7oms
CryptoSplit2 1P5rm8YmufwfNdqg6Dy47boaeBCXvEDjUP
CryptoSplit 147MddkTvgHR2kEoEpj5fjx7MK71va54y5
TrustedBusinessInvestments 1NWdUDU4X91JTKEFJRKgmW4yYsUhWnaMJH
SmallProfit 133ySbYkiA7BTtau2v3Hs4GLoDgGZFNDbD
SmallProfit (2) 1Bb4JG51DizK6iSn4w4RqhRNXPUpkhacHx
MagicBitcoinDoubler 1QLbGuc3WGKKKpLs4pBp9H6jiQ2MgPkXRp
coin-generator.net 18Xiqg52FfgA43rqCyCU5iqq6KNBgjTBj8
MMM Global 1MxA5W1TKcMwLNh6EYL9QwAMLXtifHnxwb
BTC-flow (2) 1CjGx5ujxvzdbZqzzhPREXqvxoYSgDoAgd
WeeklyPonzi 1CHJArco4Qv6cmTZNF7Km7cuATCD1Z1NSu
DoubleBot 1LWadswFVXwCoVSKAeo3tuxWKqKr1EWFxR
ClearHash.net (1) 1AFjgfnUhAYp4eh2GhbbLkCXY5xK25qJmQ
ClearHash.net (2) 1DXxLzocfWXTHVYv4MTai4LLtXZgcJDknZ
ClearHash.net (4) 19g9exzmtJ2sQbBBB3x2PiY9pReVCm8HqA
the AUC value is the highest as well.
Taking these considerations into account, the Random For-
est model obtained using CM20 can be considered the most
effective for detecting Ponzi schemes.
E. Application of the induced model
In this section perform an ex-post validation of the best
classifier obtained so far, i.e. Random Forest with CM20. To
this purpose we collect other Ponzi schemes by searching the
web, with the same methodology of Section III-A. We report
their addresses in Table III. Overall, the 20 Ponzi schemes in
this collection have gathered more than 15 millions USD, in
large part with a single scheme, CryptoSplit (see Table IV).
We then construct an alternative dataset, comprising the fea-
tures of the clusters of the Ponzi schemes in the new collection,
and those of 4000 randomly-chosen Bitcoin addresses not in
the original dataset. By applying the Random Forest classifier
with CM20 to the alternative dataset, we obtain the following
confusion matrix:
P nP
P 18 2
nP 81 3919
Notably, the classifier recognizes 18 Ponzi schemes out of
20, producing 81 false positives. The 2 Ponzi schemes not
recognized by the classifier are marked with ✗ in Table IV.
F. Ranking and evaluation of features
We now study which features, among those listed in Sec-
tion III-C, are more relevant for the classification of Ponzi
schemes. To this purpose we exploit the feature selection
functionality of Weka [43], which implements several methods
for ranking features. Among them, we apply some univariate
methods (Information Gain, Gain Ratio, Symmetrical Uncer-
tainty, and OneR), and the multivariate method ReliefF.
Among the 32 features included in our datasets, we consider
those with the highest number of occurrences in the first
positions of these rankings, and thus can be considered as the
most discriminating ones. These features are the following:
Predicted
RIP P nP
A
ct
u
al P 19 13
nP 7 6393
Predicted
BN P nP
A
ct
u
al P 23 9
nP 99 6301
Predicted
RF P nP
A
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nP 0 6400
Figure 2: Confusion matrices for RIPPER, Bayes Net and Random Forest.
RIP: 1:40
P nP
P 21 11
nP 44 6356
RIP: 1:20
P nP
P 23 9
nP 66 6334
RIP: 1:10
P nP
P 23 9
nP 97 6303
RIP: 1:5
P nP
P 24 8
nP 226 6174
BN: 1:40
P nP
P 23 9
nP 154 6246
BN: 1:20
P nP
P 23 9
nP 185 6215
BN: 1:10
P nP
P 24 8
nP 233 6167
BN: 1:5
P nP
P 25 7
nP 266 6134
RF: 1:40
P nP
P 17 15
nP 3 6397
RF: 1:20
P nP
P 19 13
nP 9 6391
RF: 1:10
P nP
P 21 11
nP 30 6370
RF: 1:5
P nP
P 25 7
nP 70 6330
Figure 3: Confusion matrices for RIPPER, Bayes Net and Random Forest across different undersampling in training data.
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Figure 4: Cost matrices: CM5, CM10, CM20, and CM40.
RIP: CM5
P nP
P 19 13
nP 7 6393
RIP: CM10
P nP
P 19 13
nP 7 6393
RIP: CM20
P nP
P 19 13
nP 7 6393
RIP: CM40
P nP
P 19 13
nP 7 6393
BN: CM5
P nP
P 24 8
nP 136 6264
BN: CM10
P nP
P 24 8
nP 155 6245
BN: CM20
P nP
P 24 8
nP 192 6203
BN: CM40
P nP
P 24 8
nP 213 6187
RF: CM5
P nP
P 25 7
nP 13 6387
RF: CM10
P nP
P 29 3
nP 26 6374
RF: CM20
P nP
P 31 1
nP 77 6323
RF: CM40
P nP
P 31 1
nP 132 6268
Figure 5: Confusion matrices of RIPPER, Bayes Net and Random Forest across different cost-matrices.
Random Forest Accuracy Recall Specificity F-measure Precision G-mean AUC
CM5 : Using Cost 5 .997 .781 .998 .714 .658 .883 .890
CM10: Using Cost 10 .995 .906 .995 .667 .527 .949 .951
CM20: Using Cost 20 .988 .969 .987 .443 .287 .978 .978
CM40: Using Cost 40 .979 .969 .979 .318 .190 .973 .974
Figure 6: Performance of Random Forest across different cost-matrices.
Table IV: Alternative set of Ponzi schemes, by cluster size.
Ponzi scheme #Addr. #Tx In (B) In ($)
CryptoSplit 1763 126,245 35,654 15,124,204
PonziCoin 243 3226 229 132,158
MagicBitcoinDoubler 135 49,239 404 77,049
coin-generator.net 36 468 2 3608
TrustedBusinessInvest 22 91 4 11,361
DoubleBot 21 298 0.35 97
WeeklyPonzi 5 827 13 6724
CoinDoubleP1 ✗ 3 90 3 1422
CoinDoubleP3 2 10 4 1680
CoinDoubleP2 2 167 3 1238
CryptoSplit2 2 292 1 336
ClearHash.net (2) 2 30 0.5 142
BTC-flow (2) 2 308 0.08 34
ClearHash.net (4) 2 13 0.01 5
SmallProfit 1 8518 32 19,961
ebitinvest.com 1 414 16 39,861
Longtermpaying 1 1504 13 3698
MMM Global ✗ 1 22 7 1663
ClearHash.net (1) 1 801 5 2094
SmallProfit (2) 1 1991 0.29 185
Total (20 schemes) 2246 194,515 36,398 15,427,373
(i) the Gini coefficient of the outgoing values; (ii) the ratio
between incoming and total transactions; (iii) the average and
standard deviation of the outgoing values; (iv) the number of
different addresses who have transferred money to the cluster,
and subsequently received money from it; (v) the lifetime of
the cluster, and the number of activity days.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Criminal activities that accept payments in bitcoins damage
the reputation of Bitcoin, and eventually may be detrimental to
the diffusion of cryptocurrencies for legitimate uses. However,
since all currency transfers are recorded on a public ledger,
surveillance authorities can analyse them, trying to detect
anomalous or suspect behaviours.
Despite the transparency of the blockchain, tracking illicit
financial flows is a challenging problem, for several rea-
sons. First, many illicit activities involve hundreds, or even
thousands, of transactions — thus making manual inspection
impracticable. For instance, the Ponzi schemes in our dataset
use ∼1400 transactions on average: this number is sufficiently
large to discourage any attempt at manual inspection. Second,
the number of illicit flows is overwhelmed by that of legitimate
ones, making the task of surveillance authorities similar to
finding “the needle in the haystack”. Another difficulty is that
smart cyber-criminals exploit techniques to make analysing
their activities more difficult, e.g. by using mixing services to
hide the actual provenance of illegal money. All these obser-
vations highlight the pressing need for automated techniques
to detect illegal activities on cryptocurrencies.
In this work we have proposed an automatic analysis
of Ponzi schemes on Bitcoin, based on supervised learning
algorithms. Ponzi schemes are a classic fraud masqueraded as
“high-yield” investment schemes. However, in a Ponzi scheme
the investors are repaid only with the funds invested by new
users, hence eventually the scheme implodes, as at a certain
point it will no longer be possible to find new investments.
After a preliminary phase of manual search, we have iden-
tified 32 Bitcoin addresses used by Ponzi schemes. Address
clustering allowed us to extend our collection to 1211 ad-
dresses, which overall received investments for ∼ 10 millions
USD. We have devised a set of features of clusters, that we
have used to create a dataset containing the features of all
the addresses of Ponzi schemes, and those of other 6400
randomly-chosen addresses. We experimented with data min-
ing tools to evaluate different supervised learning strategies.
The best classifier we have found correctly classifies 31 Ponzi
schemes out of 32, producing ∼ 1% of false positives.
An obvious extension of this work is to apply this classifier
to all the addresses in the Bitcoin blockchain. This kind of
analysis poses serious efficiency issues, since several dozens
of millions of distinct Bitcoin addresses have been used so
far. Although the number of false positives is quite low
(comparable to that of other successful approaches in the fraud
detection literature [23]), automated techniques to check the
false positives are in order. To this purpose one could exploit
auxiliary information sources, e.g. web discussion forums, and
the IP addresses collected by monitoring the traffic on the
Bitcoin network.
Our classifier can also be used to detect Ponzi schemes
implemented over other cryptocurrencies, like e.g. Ethereum.
To this purpose we could exploit public datasets of Ethereum-
based Ponzi schemes [44], which collect addresses and other
relevant data of 152 Ponzi schemes. In the case of Ethereum,
the precision of the classifier could be improved by exploiting
more specific features, like e.g. the distribution of gain among
users, and the correlation between the timings of inflows and
outflows observed in [44].
The approach we have followed in this work can be ex-
ploited for the detection of other cryptocurrency-based frauds
besides Ponzi schemes, like e.g. ransomware, money launder-
ing, etc. This would require, as in our case, a preliminary phase
of dataset construction. The dataset could take into account,
besides the features used in Section III-C, further features that
better capture specific behaviours of the fraud under analysis.
A relevant question is what interventions can be devised
after an illegal activity has been detected. The ex-post san-
itization of fraudulent activities is hampered by the current
fungibility of the Bitcoin currency. This means that Bitcoin
users and exchanges are not selective in which bitcoins to
accept, and which ones to reject. Hence, even if we set up
risk scores for Bitcoin transactions as proposed in [21], e.g. by
marking as “bad” all the bitcoins flowing out a Ponzi scheme,
it would not be possible to take countermeasures to the use of
“bad” bitcoins until they leave the Bitcoin ecosystem through
an exchange service.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: a peer-to-peer electronic cash system,”
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf, 2008.
[2] J. Bonneau, A. Miller, J. Clark, A. Narayanan, J. A. Kroll, and E. W.
Felten, “SoK: Research perspectives and challenges for Bitcoin and
cryptocurrencies,” in IEEE S & P, 2015, pp. 104–121.
[3] F. Reid and M. Harrigan, “An analysis of anonymity in the Bitcoin
system,” in Security and privacy in social networks. Springer, 2013,
pp. 197–223.
[4] S. Meiklejohn, M. Pomarole, G. Jordan, K. Levchenko, D. McCoy, G. M.
Voelker, and S. Savage, “A fistful of bitcoins: characterizing payments
among men with no names,” in Internet Measurement Conference.
ACM, 2013, pp. 127–140.
[5] ——, “A fistful of Bitcoins: characterizing payments among men with
no names,” Commun. ACM, vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 86–93, 2016.
[6] M. Mo¨ser and R. Bo¨hme, “Anonymous alone? measuring Bitcoin’s
second-generation anonymization techniques,” in EuroS&P Workshops,
2017, pp. 32–41.
[7] M. Spagnuolo, F. Maggi, and S. Zanero, “Bitiodine: Extracting intelli-
gence from the Bitcoin network,” in Financial Cryptography and Data
Security, ser. LNCS, vol. 8437. Springer, 2014, pp. 457–468.
[8] E. Androulaki, G. Karame, M. Roeschlin, T. Scherer, and S. Capkun,
“Evaluating user privacy in Bitcoin,” in Financial Cryptography and
Data Security, ser. LNCS, vol. 7859. Springer, 2013, pp. 34–51.
[9] J. Bonneau, A. Narayanan, A. Miller, J. Clark, J. A. Kroll, and E. W.
Felten, “Mixcoin: Anonymity for Bitcoin with accountable mixes,”
in Financial Cryptography and Data Security, ser. LNCS, vol. 8437.
Springer, 2014, pp. 486–504.
[10] M. Mo¨ser and R. Bo¨hme, “The price of anonymity: empirical evidence
from a market for Bitcoin anonymization,” J. Cybersecurity, vol. 3, no. 2,
pp. 127–135, 2017.
[11] J. H. Ziegeldorf, R. Matzutt, M. Henze, F. Grossmann, and K. Wehrle,
“Secure and anonymous decentralized Bitcoin mixing,” Future Genera-
tion Comp. Syst., vol. 80, pp. 448–466, 2018.
[12] K. Liao, Z. Zhao, A. Doupe´, and G. Ahn, “Behind closed doors:
measurement and analysis of cryptolocker ransoms in Bitcoin,” in APWG
Symposium on Electronic Crime Research (eCrime), 2016, pp. 1–13.
[13] S. Bistarelli, M. Parroccini, and F. Santini, “Visualizing Bitcoin
flows of ransomware: WannaCry one week later,” in ITASEC, ser.
CEUR Workshop Proceedings, no. 2058, 2018. [Online]. Available:
http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2058/#paper-13
[14] C. Brenig, R. Accorsi, and G. Mu¨ller, “Economic analysis of cryp-
tocurrency backed money laundering.” in European Conference on
Information Systems (ECIS), 2015.
[15] M. Mo¨ser, R. Bo¨hme, and D. Breuker, “An inquiry into money laun-
dering tools in the Bitcoin ecosystem,” in eCrime Researchers Summit
(eCRS), 2013. IEEE, 2013, pp. 1–14.
[16] M. Vasek and T. Moore, “There’s no free lunch, even using Bitcoin:
Tracking the popularity and profits of virtual currency scams,” in
Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 2015, pp. 44–61.
[17] M. Artzrouni, “The mathematics of Ponzi schemes,” Mathematical
Social Sciences, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 190–201, 2009. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.05.003
[18] T. Moore, J. Han, and R. Clayton, “The postmodern Ponzi scheme:
empirical analysis of high-yield investment programs,” in Financial
Cryptography and Data Security, vol. 7397. Springer, 2012, pp. 41–56.
[19] M. Vasek and T. Moore, “Analyzing the Bitcoin Ponzi scheme ecosys-
tem,” in Bitcoin Workshop, 2018, to appear.
[20] T. Moore, “The promise and perils of digital currencies,” IJCIP, vol. 6,
no. 3-4, pp. 147–149, 2013.
[21] M. Mo¨ser, R. Bo¨hme, and D. Breuker, “Towards risk scoring of Bitcoin
transactions,” in Financial Cryptography and Data Security Workshops,
2014, pp. 16–32.
[22] T. Slattery, “Taking a bit out of crime: Bitcoin and cross-border tax
evasion,” Brook. J. Int’l L., vol. 39, p. 829, 2014.
[23] S. Bhattacharyya, S. Jha, K. Tharakunnel, and J. C. Westland, “Data
mining for credit card fraud: A comparative study,” Decision Support
Systems, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 602–613, 2011.
[24] C. Whitrow, D. J. Hand, P. Juszczak, D. Weston, and N. M. Adams,
“Transaction aggregation as a strategy for credit card fraud detection,”
Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 30–55, Feb
2009.
[25] J. T. Quah and M. Sriganesh, “Real-time credit card fraud detection
using computational intelligence,” Expert Systems with Applications,
vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 1721–1732, 2008.
[26] D. J. Weston, D. J. Hand, N. M. Adams, C. Whitrow, and P. Juszczak,
“Plastic card fraud detection using peer group analysis,” Advances in
Data Analysis and Classification, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 45–62, Apr 2008.
[27] N. Carneiro, G. Figueira, and M. Costa, “A data mining based system for
credit-card fraud detection in e-tail,” Decision Support Systems, vol. 95,
no. Supplement C, pp. 91–101, 2017.
[28] A. D. Pozzolo, O. Caelen, Y. L. Borgne, S. Waterschoot, and G. Bon-
tempi, “Learned lessons in credit card fraud detection from a practitioner
perspective,” Expert Systems with Applications, vol. 41, no. 10, pp.
4915–4928, 2014.
[29] T. Pham and S. Lee, “Anomaly detection in Bitcoin network using
unsupervised learning methods,” CoRR, vol. abs/1611.03941, 2016.
[30] P. Monamo, V. Marivate, and B. Twala, “Unsupervised learning for
robust Bitcoin fraud detection,” in 2016 Information Security for South
Africa, ISSA, 2016, pp. 129–134.
[31] A. Abdallah, M. A. Maarof, and A. Zainal, “Fraud detection system:
A survey,” Journal of Network and Computer Applications, vol. 68, no.
Supplement C, pp. 90–113, 2016.
[32] N. V. Chawla, N. Japkowicz, and A. Kotcz, “Editorial: special issue
on learning from imbalanced data sets,” SIGKDD Explorations, vol. 6,
no. 1, pp. 1–6, 2004.
[33] N. Thai-Nghe, Z. Gantner, and L. Schmidt-Thieme, “Cost-sensitive
learning methods for imbalanced data,” in International Joint Conference
on Neural Networks, IJCNN 2010, Barcelona, Spain, 18-23 July, 2010,
2010, pp. 1–8.
[34] A. Biryukov and I. Pustogarov, “Bitcoin over tor isn’t a good idea,” in
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE Computer Society,
2015, pp. 122–134.
[35] J. Dupont and A. C. Squicciarini, “Toward de-anonymizing Bitcoin by
mapping users location,” in Proc. of the 5th ACM Conference on Data
and Application Security and Privacy (CODASPY). ACM, 2015, pp.
139–141.
[36] T. Neudecker and H. Hartenstein, “Could network information facilitate
address clustering in Bitcoin?” in Financial Cryptography Workshops,
ser. LNCS, vol. 10323. Springer, 2017, pp. 155–169.
[37] M. Bartoletti, S. Lande, L. Pompianu, and A. Bracciali, “A gen-
eral framework for blockchain analytics,” in Proc. 1st Workshop on
Scalable and Resilient Infrastructures for Distributed Ledgers (SE-
RIAL@Middleware). ACM, 2017, pp. 7:1–7:6.
[38] J. V. Hulse, T. M. Khoshgoftaar, and A. Napolitano, “Experimental
perspectives on learning from imbalanced data,” in Proc. 24th Int. Conf.
on Machine Learning (ICML), 2007, pp. 935–942.
[39] W. W. Cohen, “Fast effective rule induction,” in In Proceedings of
the Twelfth International Conference on Machine Learning. Morgan
Kaufmann, 1995, pp. 115–123.
[40] S. Maes, K. Tuyls, B. Vanschoenwinkel, and B. Manderick, “Credit
card fraud detection using bayesian and neural networks,” in Proc. 1st
International NAISO Congress on Neuro Fuzzy Technologies, 2002.
[41] L. Breiman, “Random forests,” Machine Learning, vol. 45,
no. 1, pp. 5–32, Oct 2001. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010933404324
[42] L. Rokach, “Decision forest: twenty years of research,” Information
Fusion, vol. 27, pp. 111––125, 2016.
[43] I. Witten, E. Frank, M. Hall, and C. Pal, DATA MINING: Practical
Machine Learning Tools and Techniques. San Francisco, CA, USA:
Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 2016.
[44] M. Bartoletti, S. Carta, T. Cimoli, and R. Saia, “Dissecting Ponzi
schemes on Ethereum: identification, analysis, and impact,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1703.03779, 2017.
